Melanie Manuel, Chloe
Azurin, Natalie Lortz, Deyana Lam
ASA 150E
Professor Valverde
15 February 2020
Week
7 Presentation Write Up
The introduction and the
first half of chapter one in Nayan Chanda’s Brother Enemy connects to
the theme of Ancient History of Viet Nam, Cambodia, and Laos by introducing a
first account of the fall of Saigon. This first person account has an
interesting take on the event, being that it is filtered through the eyes of
Nayan Chanda, a journalist, with a curiosity of uncovering more about the
Vietnam War. In some ways, that is similar to our experiences as readers,
because the Vietnam War is a layered event that necessitates a little more
research for understanding. There are hidden histories to be discovered and
understood, and as mentioned, the introduction and the first half of the first
chapter hints to these things, just as they begin to unravel for Nayan Chanda.
The introduction is a thesis to the crux of the book, where he states that this
“is the story of the historic struggle in Indochina and the big-power diplomacy
that surrounded it” (Chanda 7). This, in turn, begins to unfold in the first
half of chapter one, where Chanda has titled it: “Old Enemies, New War.” He
provides an in-depth but direct summation of relations between the countries
involved in Indochina, which include Vietnam, Cambodia, and China. In the
section titled, “Battle for Islands,” Chanda describes the rivalry between
Vietnam and Cambodia, specifically over territorial claims over the Spratly
Islands. Here, it is mentioned that despite working together, Vietnam and
Cambodia did not have a particularly good relationship. The Khmer Rouge who had
taken control of Cambodia had challenged the Vietnamese for ownership of
islands in the Gulf of Thailand, leading to these Vietnamese killing “many
Khmer soldiers” (Chanda 13). That had been prior to the fall of Saigon;
however, at the fall of Saigon, the Khmer Rouge that this was an opportune time
to make claim through occupation, before deciding against this. The lack of
accountability from Cambodia created a sense of distrust between Vietnam and
Cambodia. Again, the following section called, “A Rush to the Spratlys” circles
back to the fight for Spratly Islands. The land itself is known for its biomes
as well as, most notably, for oil reserves. Each instance mentioned refers back
to power relations dealt by Vietnam with another country from Indochina, and
such relations have culminated in understanding the country’s own undoing as
well as its international relations that might have allowed it stand formidably
during this tumultuous time.
The second half of
chapter 1 focuses on the gritted teeth diplomacy of the tense relationships in
Indochina that took place in the years following the Vietnam War. The first
half of the chapter focuses on the last American attempt of a power display and
its abysmal failure, but the rest of the chapter focuses on how a unified and
confident Vietnam made the rest of the world nervous. As Chanda writes, “after
going through and defeating the most powerful nation on earth, everything
seemed possible.” (Chanda, 24). Apparently, such possibilities included the
ability to shrug off the interests of those other superpowers like the Soviet
Union. It is at this point that Vietnam becomes embroiled in a more sinister
type of war: diplomacy, with the author emphasizing China as one of its chief
opponents in the game. China, which had been battling Vietnam for thousands of
years, was labeled by Chanda as the real loser of the Vietnam war despite a
lack of direct involvement. The author paints the Chinese in an almost
desperate light as they try to win the respect of the country by citing that
the “invincibility of the people’s war” (Chanda, 24) which supposedly brought
the Vietnamese victory was borrowed from their benevolent big brother China.
However, these gilded threats and warnings did not deter the Vietnamese from
entertaining the Soviet Union’s request for military bases. And when China’s
hubris allowed them to think that they would have better luck in persuading
Vietnam to come under their wing, banquets hosting Vietnamese politicians
quickly revealed the cold and polite rejection of China’s imposition on
Vietnam. Yet Chanda does fail to present Vietnam without its blunders.
Accompanying Duan’s defense of an independent Vietnam is a plea for continued
aid from China. China’s wounded pride and indignation were filtered through the
diplomatic responses and glaring, chilly lack of responses to Vietnamese
celebrations. But Vietnam’s communique which cited “special
relationships” with Laos and Cambodia were stumbling and building blocks to
create alliances against China and with the rest of the world.
For
the entirety of the chapter, I was continuously entertained by how delicate the
feelings of countries become when negotiating power and alliances. The idea of
posturing and the peril of walking the tightrope of exuding generosity versus
weakness and contempt versus firmness laced every part of diplomatic
negotiations. Diplomacy is a war unto itself and seems paradoxical It can both
send a ripple effect through the relations and economies of the world, as well
as have absolutely zero effect on the lives of the truly suffering.
Chapter four dealt with
looking at the history and relations of Vietnam being colonized by China and
France. It also touches on its relations with the other Indochinese countries.
There were rising tensions between Cambodia and Vietnam and Cambodia mainly
looked towards China for support to protect its borders. Vietnamese officials
knew of this and created a very interesting relationship with China over the
period of its time being colonized by them. China rulers viewed the Vietnamese
as barbarians that needed Chinese rule in order to become civilized. Vietnam
obviously did not have the same feelings as they did but was aware of their
reality is that they did not have the same military power or population as
China, so it would very unwise to try and be aggressive. Throughout China's
colonization of Vietnam, whenever China sent military armies to conquer more
areas, the Vietnamese would sometimes fight and defeat these armies coming
through. Instantly when this would happen, they would send formal apologies to
the Chinese emperor at that time to not further any conflict. Interestingly,
this was enough for the Chinese emperor at that time to not create bloodshed
for their "wrongdoing". It is clear that the ancient history between
these two countries is basically a love-hate relationship in a sense. There
were Chinese traditions the Vietnamese really enjoyed continuing to practice,
but then there was also hate towards their own practices were suppressed. Once
the French came in and colonized Indochina, these countries looked towards
China (who had previously colonized Indochina and were kicked out by the
French) for help to gain their independence back. It is interesting how
everything in a sense came into a full circle.
Once Indochina was free
of France, Ho Chi Minh and others were looking to create the Indochinese
Communist Party that would unite Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos. The reasoning for
this was the belief that they had all faced similar struggles, despite the
issues they have with one another and that they should work together to protect
their borders. The Vietnamese summed up their historical experience by this
"law" which was that colonizers looked to gain control of all three
countries by creating division between them, weakening their relationships and
then taking over each one by one. This was the strategy that led to issues
between these countries for the benefit of colonialism. China was not in favor
of this unity between the three Indochinese countries, but did not see this
movement as a current threat and instead wanted to focus on the threats it was
facing from the northwest. Eventually, in the late 1800s, China began to fear a
full-blown issue with Vietnam as it became pressured by the French from the
south and also threats from the north. They were not willing to take on these
issues or war, so China was able to ease tensions by signing a treaty with
France that gave them suzerainty over Vietnam.
The history between
China and Vietnam strongly resembles the history between ancient Egypt and
their Nile River neighbors, the Hittites. Ancient Egypt was a larger, more
established civilization, however, the Hittites adopted much of Egyptian
culture. In fact, they adopted so much Egyptian culture to the point of
claiming that they were more Egyptian than the actual Egyptians. Similarly,
Vietnam, China's smaller neighbor, ended up adopting much of China's political
and writing systems. Like the Hittites and the Egyptians, Vietnam and China
also had battles over territory, as well as a tinge of ethnic supremacism, as
all battles of this nature had. However, the main difference between these two
situations was that China viewed Vietnam as barbaric and forcefully inflicted
its customs, traditions, hairstyle, and dress on the Vietnamese. The Hittites
either respected the Egyptians' customs or personally identified with their
symbols so much that they adopted it as their own. The Vietnamese did not have
so much as a choice. Additionally, the Hittites were well known for their iron
work, while the Egyptians were not. As a result, the Egyptians had more respect
for the Hittites than China had for Vietnam.
Personally, I always
notice how much studying history, particularly wars and or battles, reminds me
of the toddlers at work that I watch over. In both circumstances, it seems to
boil down to fighting over one accolade, be it land, prestige, or the biggest
toy truck in the room. Comparing these two relationships between two completely
different countries on two separate continents represents how history repeats
itself and the core of international conflict is the entitled inner child of an
authoritative political figure who wants the toy, feels they deserve it more
than the others simply because they want it, and will do what they can to get
it.
Works Cited
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